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The occasion of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's 50th anniversary is an
apt time to recall India's longstanding democracy: a phenomenon almost
unique at one time among the developing countries and a source of
legitimate pride to our leaders and our people.
New versus Old Thinking
It is also a fitting occasion to affirm the new thinking on the
relationship between democracy and development, more sanguine and
optimistic now, that has replaced the old thinking, more despondent and
pessimistic then. Many subscribed to the view then (for reasons that I shall
presently discuss) that democracy definitely came at the expense of
development, so that one had to choose between doing good and doing
well. The new thinking is that this trade-off, or the "cruel dilemma" as I
called it nearly thirty years ago1 , is by no means a compelling necessity ,
that one may be able to eat one's cake and have it: either democracy does
not handicap development or, in the best of circumstances, it even
promotes it.
Thus, the pursuit of political and civil virtue, as the embrace of
democracy implies, need not be at the expense of the drive for economic
development. All good things may sometimes go together, just as we have
discovered that literacy is good in itself and for development, and that
female education emancipates women while restraining the growth of
population and enhancing the possibility of greater economic prosperity for
smaller numbers.
1
 Cf. Jagdish Bhagwati, The Economics of Underdeveloped Countries. The World University
Library Series, Weidenfeld & Nicolson: London, 1966. The Princeton political scientist, Atul
Kohli, has thus christened this the "cruel dilemma" thesis; see his "Democracy and
Development", in John Lewis and Valeriana Kallab (eds.), Development Strategies
Reconsidered. Overseas Development Council: Washington D.C., 1986.
Echoes of Old Thinking:
The new view represents a nuanced change, of course. Few claim
that democracy is necessarily, or even overwhelmingly, better for
development, but only that democracy can be consonant with, even
promoting, development. In doing so, they keep in mind the witticism,
attributed to the Oxford social anthropologist Evans-Pritchard, that the only
generalization in social sciences is that there is no generalization, or the
Cambridge economist Joan Robinson's mischievous remark that, in
Economics, everything and its opposite are true (for you can almost always
find evidence somewhere, for some historical period, in support of almost
anything).
Indeed, if one eyeballs the postwar performance on growth rates
and the prevalence of democracy in the developing countries, it is hard to
find a strong relationship between democracy or its absence in a country
and its growth rate. Democracy has broken out only in recent years across
the developing world: in the last two decades, nearly forty countries have
turned to democracy.2 For the bulk of the postwar period, therefore, we had
only India, Costa Rica and Sri Lanka as democracies over a sustained
period. True, their growth rates were far from compelling. But then the
nondemocratic countries had also an immense variety of performances,
ranging from the spectacular in the Far East to disastrous in many nations
of Africa. Looking only at the developing countries in the postwar period,
therefore, it would be hard to conclude that democracies have had less
rapid developmental performance. In fact, if the developed countries are
2
 At the same time, Samuel Huntington has noted, since the early 1970s, only four or five of
the new democracies have returned to authoritarian rule. Cf. 'The Ungovernability of
Democracy", The American Enterprise. November/December 1993, p.35.
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considered instead, the democracies have done immensely better than the
socialist dictatorships that have now happily vanished, at least for the
present, from our midst.
To maintain therefore, as did the old view, that democracy
necessarily handicaps development whereas authoritarianism aids it, is to
argue a case that must explain away these facts by citing other factors and
cross-country differences that overwhelm the outcomes.3 Indeed,
democracy and authoritarianism are only one dimension on which
countries and their developmental performances differ: and, to develop the
more nuanced and new view that is favourable to democracy as compatible
with, even conducive at times to, development, I shall address qualitatively
and directly the ways in which, and the reasons why, such a happy
symbiosis is the likely reality.
But it would be wrong for me to suggest that the old, dismal and
deterministic view is necessarily dead. Echoes, amplified by nondemocratic
governments with successful developmental performance, can often be
heard. It is not uncommon, for instance, to find Prime Minister Lee Kuan
Yew talking continually on the theme of democracy's "undisciplined" ways
that his "soft" authoritarian rule has prevented from debilitating Singapore
and crippling her development. Thus, he has argued4 :
3
 A number of statistical and quasi-statistical studies, by economists such as John Helliwell
and political scientists such as Atul Kohli, have argued that the evidence does not support
the view that the relationship between democracy and growth rates is negative, nor does it
support the contrary view. These results are therefore more eclectic and enable us to raise
the qualitative questions that are considered in the Lecture. Cf. Kohli, op.cit. and John
Helliwell,"Empirical Linkages between Democracy and Growth", National Bureau of
Economic Research: Cambridge, Mass., Working Paper No. 4066.
4
 Cited in The Economist. August 27, 1994, page 15. Also, see Prime Minister Yew's
nuanced and fascinating interview with Fareed Zakaria in Foreign Affairs. March/April 1994,
pp. 109-126.
"I believe what a country needs to develop is discipline more than
democracy. The exuberance of democracy leads to indiscipline and
disorderly conduct which are inimical to development."
And indeed the phenomenal success of the Far Eastern economies
— South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong —, none of them
democracies in a substantive sense5, has created for some a sense that the
old thinking was right after all, especially when these economic miracles
are contrasted with India's poor economic performance over more than
three decades within a democratic framework.
Those who think thus, believing that authoritarianism facilitates
more rapid growth (with other suitable policies such as market reforms in
place, of course) have also argued that the optimal policy sequencing of
markets and democracy in the developing countries, as also in the former
socialist countries, must be to get markets first and democracy next. This
conclusion is reinforced in their minds by the recent Russian descent from a
superpower to a supine status when the sequence she chose was to put
qlasnost before perestroika while the Chinese, who clearly introduced
markets before democracy, clearly did immensely better. Does this not
imply that perestroika must precede, not follow, qlasnost? If so, this
prescription rests on two legs:
* First, it reflects the old view on democracy and development —
that the two are at odds and authoritarianism must be tolerated to facilitate
rapid growth.
5
 Hong Kong, while not a democracy, has had more of its attributes than the other three
countries.
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* Second, It invokes the notion, based both on historical experience
and the recent evidence that democratic demands have arisen in South
Korea and other economically successful countries, that growth will
ultimately create an effective push for democracy. The historical experience
is substantial and persuasive, starting from Ralf Dahrendorf's illuminating
analysis of Germany6 and Barrington Moore's classic demonstration that
the rise of the bourgeoisie led to democracy.7
Yet, these proponents of the old view are now outnumbered by those
who take the new view. The reason is not necessarily ideological: indeed,
social scientists are not proof from the blinkers that blind us to facts that fail
to support our beliefs, and it is indeed true that the new view has triumphed
when democracy has become both a widespread value and reality, and
dictatorship a devalued mode of governance, so that we may be seeing
virtues in democracy the way a nomad in the desert finds water in a mirage.
The fact rather is that the old view is now seen as having rested on
premises that were false, and our thinking on the question has become
more nuanced and acute.
The Old View: The "Cruel Dilemma" Thesis
The old view reflected a particular way of looking at the
developmental process, fashionable during the 1950s and 1960s. It was
also grounded in a specific historical context which defined the constricting
assumptions under which the old view gained credence.
The historical context was, of course, the contest between the two
6Cf. Ralf Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany. New York:Doubleday, 1966.
7
 Cf. Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Boston: Beacon
Press, 1966. For those who work with regressions, one must then also caution that a strong
association between democracy and development may mean, not that democracy promotes
development, but that development leads to democracy.
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"sleeping giants": China and India. China was totalitarian and India a
democracy then; nothing has changed in that regard! In the intellectual eye,
trained politically on the Cold War and the arena of the Third World, the
developmental success of India, rather than of China, would set the correct
example for the Third World nations: democracy would do better and
totalitarianism worse, thus putting more nations in the Third World on a
course that would favour the Western democracies in their struggle with the
Soviet bloc.
The race was, in turn, between two nations that had committed
themselves to economic development. This, of course, removed from the
intellectual context the question which must be faced if democracy and
authoritarian rule are to be contrasted fully: which system is more likely to
seek development? The question rather was: once you are committed to
development, which political regime, democracy or authoritarian rule, is
likely to facilitate the fulfillment of that goal?
To answer that question, one must have a "model" of the
developmental process. In fact, one always does, whether explicitly if one is
an economist or implicitly if one is not. The model that nearly everyone
actively planning for development in the early postwar decades happened
to use was attributed to the British economist Sir Roy Harrod and the
American economist Evsey Domar. It is called, quite properly, the Harrod-
Domar model even though Domar wrote independently about it only
several years after Harrod, in contrast to the fiercely cruel practice in the
natural sciences where, as James Watson reminded us in his vivid account
of the contest for the Nobel Prize in The Double Helix, if you beat your rival
to a discovery by an epsilon moment, you have reduced her to the
9
disappointment of oblivion. Contrary to their subject matter which builds on
man's basest, not his noblest, instincts to show how the pursuit of private
interest can be harnessed to produce public good, economists can be quite
generous indeed!
The Harrod-Domar model, much used then8, analyzed development
in terms of two parameters: the rate of investment and the productivity of
capital.9 As it happened, for policy-making purposes, the latter parameter
was largely treated as "given" as a datum, so that the policy freedom was
assigned only to the former parameter, the investment rate.10 The debate
therefore centered only on the question of how to promote investment. This
approach, favoured by mainstream economists, coincided with the Marxist
focus on "primitive accumulation" as the mainspring of industrialization and
also with the cumbersome quasi-Marxist models elaborated in the
investment-allocation literature that grew up around the Cambridge
economist, Maurice Dobb.
But if the focus was on accumulation, with its productivity considered
8
 Perhaps the only other influential idea, to be formally modelled only forty years later, was
that of Paul Rosenstein-Rodan who, just at the end of the Second World War, argued that
several investments would have to be coordinated and simultaneously undertaken in a Big
Push with the aid of State intervention to rescue a developing country from a stagnant
equilibrium. This idea provided the theoretical impetus for the planning approach to
development and to the widespread practice of Five Year Plans in several countries, even
though the actual practice went back to the Soviets.
9
 The idea is perfectly simple. The increment in income, which naturally determines the
growth rate of income, must obviously depend on how much you invest and how much you
get out of it. The two parameters in the text are precisely what will tell you the magnitudes of
these determinants of the growth rate.
10
 Interestingly, some economists such as Gunnar Myrdal thought at the time that the
socialist countries would be able to grow faster than capitalist countries also because they
would be able to increase the productivity of investment, reducing the capital required to
produce output (and thus reducing the marginal capital-output ratio in the denominator of
the Harrod-Domar growth equation which can be written to equate the growth rate of income
with the average savings ratio divided by the marginal capital-output ratio), by technological
innovation in things like prefab housing. How wrong they were: for, as discussed in the text,
they failed altogether to consider the question of the incentives to innovate and to produce
efficiently in these regimes that had neither markets nor democracy.
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a datum, it was evident that democracies would be handicapped vis-a-vis
authoritarian regimes, when both were similarly wedded to accelerating
development. For, it seemed natural to assume that the authoritarian
regimes would be able to extract a greater surplus from their populations
through taxation and "takings" and be able therefore to raise domestic
savings and investment to higher levels than would democracies that had
to woo voters to pay the necessary taxes and accept the sacrifices more
willingly. The economist Richard Cooper of Harvard University has an
amusing but telling analysis of the remarkable association between the fall
of Finance Ministers and the fact that they had devalued their currencies: I
have little doubt that the Finance Ministers who have wittingly or unwittingly
crossed the line through tough taxation have fared no better, being
scapegoated and sacrificed by their Prime Ministers or dumped by irate
voters at the polls soon after. Hence I wrote in the mid-1960s of "the cruel
choice between rapid (self-sustained) expansion and democratic
processes".11
But this thesis was to be proven false for three reasons that have a
bearing on the new view:
* the argument that the state would generate the necessary savings
through tax effort, to accelerate development, has simply not held true:
public sector savings have not been one of the engines of growth since
public sector profligacy and deficits, rather than fiscal prudence and budget
surpluses, have been the norm;
* savings rates have risen substantially in the private sector instead,
when many thought that they would be relatively unimportant, suggesting
Bhagwati, op.cit., 1966, p.204. Also see Kohli, op.cit. p. 156.
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that where incentives to invest have increased dramatically, so has the
necessary savings to exploit those opportunities, in a virtuous circle that
has taken savings and investments to higher levels in both democracies
(including India) and authoritarian countries (such as the Far Eastern
superperformers whose savings rates are higher than those of India); and
* the differential performance among different countries seems to
have reflected, not so much differences in their investment rates as the
productivity of these investments, and this in turn surely has reflected the
efficiency of the policy framework within which these investments have
been undertaken.
I would say that, by the 1980s, it was manifest that the policy
framework, in its broadest sense, determining the productivity of investment
(and possibly even increasing saving and investment themselves through
incentive effects) was absolutely critical, and that winners and losers would
be sorted out by the choices they made in this regard and indeed quite
differently from the way we thought in the 1950s.12
Incentives promoting development, not the ability to force the pace
through draconian State action, became the objects of a key shift in focus.
And here democracy was far from being the obvious loser; in fact, it
seemed, at least at first blush, to be at an advantage instead. For who could
doubt that democracy would relate development to people and build on
incentives rather than compulsions? Yet, this can only be the starting point
for a fresh inquiry into the relationship between democracy and
development, a question that is now seen to be more complex and difficult
12
 Cf. Bhagwati, "Democracy and Development" in Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner (ed.s),
Capitalism. Socialism and Democracy Revisited. Baltimore The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1993, pp.31-38.
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and yielding an answer that is arguably more favourable to democracy than
we thought earlier.
Indeed, reflection on the problem suggests three plausible and
profound propositions that I will presently address:
* for ideological and structural reasons, democracy may well
dominate authoritarianism as a political system that produces economic
development;
* the quality of development also can be expected generally to be
better under democracy; and the better the quality of the democracy itself,
the greater is likely to be the quality of development; and
* the dividends from political democracy are likely to be greater if it
is combined with economic markets: the combination of democracy and
markets is likely to be a powerful engine of development.
These propositions are stated in terms of likelihoods rather than
certainties because the argument must proceed at times in terms of the
balance of contrary forces and a judgment of their relative importance. The
apparent contradiction nonetheless between them and reality must also be
resolved by observing that, in the real world, one cannot expect the factors
that suggest the plausibility of these propositions to be proof from the
invasion of other countervailing events. Thus, for instance, even if
democracy were expected to generate more development, initial conditions
conducive to growth may be more favourable in an authoritarian country
than in a democracy, leading to more development in the former: as indeed
may have been the case with the authoritarian superperforming Far Eastern
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economies which inherited both egalitarian land reforms and remarkably
high rates of literacy: two factors that are widely considered by economists
today to stimulate development.
Democracy and Development: Bedfellows?
Democracy, considered to consist of the troika: the right to vote and
turn out governments, an independent judiciary and a free press, defines
both an ideology and a structure. The ideology is that of the process of
governance: by consent. The structure consists of the institutions by which
this ideology is implemented. Both the ideology and the institutions of a
democracy can be argued to contribute to development, though there are
some downsides as well.13
(A) Ideology:
The most plausible arguments in favour of democracy as being
conducive to development on grounds of its ideological or process-of-
consent content are twofold. One, for which there is now substantial
evidence, is that democracies rarely go to war against each other; the other,
which is speculative, is that authoritarian regimes "bottle up" problems
while democracies permit catharsis, the apparent chaos of democracy in
fact constituting a safety valve that strengthens, instead of undermining, the
state and provides the ultimate stability that is conducive to development.
(1) Democracies At Peace Among Themselves: If democracies do
not fight wars with one another, and they fight only with nondemocratic
nations that fight each other in turn, the probability of entering a war if a
13
 I consider democracy broadly here, in contrast to authoritarianism, without entering the
added nuances that come from considering the quality of democracy, an issue taken up
later in the Lecture.
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nation is democratic could well be less than if it was nondemocratic.14 That,
in turn, could mean that democracies are more likely to both provide
governance that is conducive to peace and hence prosperity and to spend
less on fighting wars and preparing for them.
As it happens, political scientists have now established that, in nearly
two centuries, democracies "have rarely clashed with one another in violent
or potentially violent conflict and (by some reasonable criteria) have
virtually never fought one another in a full-scale international war".15
In his "Perpetual Peace", published in 1795, the philosopher
Immanuel Kant argued why democratic "republics" would naturally pursue
peace. The ingrained habit of "respect" for others that such a republic
would foster, as also the interests of the citizens whose welfare rather than
that of absolute monarchs would be at stake, would both serve to promote
peace rather than war.
Thus, Kant thought that the ideology of democracy, embodied in the
idea of rule by consent, would mean that democracies, used to domestic
governance by such consent, would naturally extend to other republics,
14
 Take three countries. If there are one democracy and two dictatorships, the former will
never fight a war, the latter can. If there are two democracies and one dictatorship, each of
the former can fight only with the dictatorship while the latter can fight with each democracy.
Relying only on the data on actual wars to make the foregoing argument is however not
correct. For, there may be many dictatorships which have not gone to war while every
democracy has, so that the average tendency of a dictatorship to get into a war may be less
than that of a democracy.
15
 Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace,
1946-1986", American Political Science Review. Vol.87 (3), September 1993, p.624. As
always, there is extended debate among political scientists whether this observation is
robust. Some have contended that the proposition is exaggerated by some fairly fast and
loose characterization of selected countries in the data set, whereas others (e.g. Henry
Farber and Joanne Gowa, "Politics and Peace", International Security. Vol.20, No.2, Fall
1995) have argued that the evidence for this relationship between democracy and peace is
less compelling before World War II and that, after World War II, the peace among
democracies was due to shared political interests expressed in political alliances (a
contention that itself may be rejected as a qualification since the alliances in turn may simply
be reflecting a shared peaceability among the democracies).
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similarly governed, accommodation by mutual discourse, dialogue and the
resolution of disputes without war.16
But he also argued that the structure of democracy, or what we might
call interests, would also inhibit wars because democratic leaders would
find it more difficult to mobilize their citizens to fight wars. To quote him17:
"If the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide that war
should be declared (and in this constitution it cannot but be the case),
nothing is more natural than that they would be very cautious in
commencing such a poor game, decreeing for themselves all the calamities
of war. Among the latter would be having to fight, having to pay the costs of
war from their own resources, having painfully to repair the devastation war
leaves behind, and, to fill up the measure of evils, load themselves with a
heavy national debt that would embitter peace itself and that can never be
liquidated on account of constant wars in the future. But, on the other hand,
in a constitution which is not republican, and under which the subjects are
not citizens, a declaration of war is the easiest thing in the world to decide
upon, because war does not require of the ruler, who is the proprietor and
not a member of the state, the least sacrifice of the pleasure of his table, the
chase, his country houses, his court functions, and the like. He may,
therefore, resolve on war as on a pleasure party for the most trivial reasons,
and with perfect indifference leave the justification which decency requires
to the diplomatic corps who are ever ready to provide it."
It is not altogether clear whether the ideological or the structural
argument should predominate as the explanation of democratic peace,
even as both contribute to the outcome18; recent empirical tests suggest that
18
 The most striking and original revival of Kant's argument is due to Michael Doyle, "Kant,
Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs, Part I", Philosophy & Public Affairs. Vol. 12(3), Summer
1983.
17
 Immanuel Kant, "Perceptual Peace" in The Enlightenment, ed. Peter Gay, New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1974, pp. 790-792; quoted in Doyle, ibid.
18
 My former student, Manmohan Agarwal of Jawaharlal Nehru University, has suggested a
quasi-Kantian reason that may prompt democracies at times to be peaceful in their disputes
with other democracies. Consider cases where one needs to demonise the enemy before
one can carry one's citizens into a war. This may then be a lot more difficult if the enemy is a
democracy that is open and accessible and hence hard to paint in stark colours as a rogue
nation than if the enemy were authoritarian and contacts with its subjects made it difficult to
sustain the necessary propaganda. Of course, this is also a principal reason why totalitarian
countries such as the Soviet Union have gone to great lengths to prevent contacts by their
subjects with the citizens of the democracies such as the United States that they were pitted
against.
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the ideological one does.19 This is perhaps what one should expect: the
habits of mind, and patterns of practice and procedure, set by the "norms"
that a society works with domestically, will surely constrain and shape
behaviour towards others beyond the nation state.
Thus, it is entirely in keeping with the Kantian argument that it is the
liberal states in the Western world, who maintain the rights of their own
citizens to exit, who, despite the social and political strains posed by rising
refugee flows and illegal immigration, have by and large worried about
providing rights to such immigrants, not the states that have denied their
own citizens the right to move away.20
(2) "Safety Valve" versus "Bottling Up": The "respect" for others that
Kant observed as the mark of republics as against monarchies, of
democracies as against authoritarian rulers, also leads to dialogue and
debate, at times vociferous and impassioned. This is often mistaken for
crippling chaos: it is merely the robust noise of a functioning democracy.
Its chief virtue is that where different groups, whether classes, tribes
or castes, jostle for voice and representation, it provides a platform for the
contest and an airing of the demands, yielding a catharsis if not the
19
 Cf. Maoz and Russett, op.cit. Again, my political science colleague Ed Mansfield has
reminded me that some political scientists have reservations about the Maoz-Russett tests
and about the specific proxies used by them. Among the recent reexaminations of the
issue, see in particular Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic
Peace", International Security. Vol.19, No.2, Fall 1994, pp.5-49; and David Spiro, 'The
Insignificance of the Liberal Peace", International Security. Vol.19, No.2, Fall 1994, pp. 50-
86.
201 should also add that the Kantian argument, and the Russett-Moaz evidence in support of
it, relate to democracy , not to the process of democratization. The latter raises the question
as to how warlike the transition to democracy is likely to be. Comparing no-change to such
transition, Ed Mansfield and Jack Snyder have contended that the former is shown by some
empirical evidence to be more peaceable. Cf. their "Democratization, Nationalism, and War:
The Evidence", Foreign Affairs. May/June 1995.
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satisfaction that success brings and thus acting as a safety valve.
The instinct and the practice of authoritarian regimes, on the other
hand, is to repress, to bottle up, these conflicts, building towards eventual
eruption when the pressures have built up to an explosive level. I suspect
that the success in some of the Far Eastern countries in maintaining an
authoritarian structure over a long period owed in part to their initial
equality of incomes which made class conflicts less to compelling, to the
racial homogeneity of their populations (except for Singapore) which ruled
out inter-ethnic tensions, and to the absence of religious divisions. It is
unlikely that they would have managed so well if these favourable
conditions had been absent: the disadvantages of authoritarianism would
probably have shown up in these regimes.
(B) Structure:
The structure of democracy, with its institutions of voting rights, an
independent judiciary that often requires judicial review and leads to
judicial restraint on legislative and executive power, and a free press, also
sets it apart from authoritarian rule. The restraint of arbitrary power can be a
powerful source of development; but a functioning democracy can also lead
to what Jonathan Rauch has called demosclerosis: the paralysis of gridlock
afflicting a lobbying-infested democracy.
One could argue that authoritarian governments may be prone to
extravagance and waste, inhibiting development, because there is no
restraining hand among the citizenry to hold them back and also because,
as the late Nobel-laureate economist from St. Lucia, Arthur Lewis, who had
advised many governments in single-party authoritarian governments in
Africa, remarked to me, the leaders in such governments manage to delude
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themselves that the monuments they build for themselves are really a gift to
posterity, equating personal indulgence with social glory. And, reflecting on
how the authoritarian governments of Latin America and the socialist bloc
ran up impossibly large debts during the mid-1970s and much of 1980s,
just before and after the debt crisis arrived on the world scene, one may
well conclude that, by and large, autocrats are likely to argue, with Keynes,
that "in the long run we are all dead", and then ignore posterity for
immediate gain, whereas the democracies are likely to be characterized by
leaders who see continuity of national interests beyond their own rule more
naturally.
The economist Mancur Olson has produced a rather different
argument that also militates in favour of democracy as an institution likely to
produce development.21 He argues that dictators are more likely to
overshoot in the direction of "takings" from their subjects than Kantian
republicans, since they will attach less weight to their citizens' welfare than
to their own. The effect will correspondingly be to leave citizens less secure
in their property rights and hence to reduce their incentive to produce more
income.22 In effect, Olson suggests that the incentive to save and invest,
and hence the growth of the economy, will be adversely affected under a
dictatorship.
Not merely are authoritarian rulers more likely to be more self-
regarding than democratic leaders. Their ability to be more self-regarding
also follows from the structure of democracy. For, democracy will lead to
21
 Mancur Olson, "Dictatorship, Democracy and Development", American Political Science
Review. September 1993.
22
 Theoretically, this argument can be invalidated if the dictator saves more than the citizens,
implying that the dictator is future-regarding rather than simply self-indulgent. Olson must
therefore be implicitly assuming that the dictator is extravagant rather than frugal, an
assumption that must in turn be justified as I did earlier.
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restraints on "takings" from the citizens, in particular via the possibility of
appeal to an independent judiciary that may well reverse such "takings" as
unconstitutional or unjustified and the availability of a free press that can
document and thus restrain the state's extravagance.
But the structure of democracy, in other ways, can also create waste,
even paralysis of useful state action, through the lobbying activities of
special interests. To see how lobbying can indirectly lead to waste as
surely as directly wasting resources, conduct a mental experiment. Imagine
that some revenue is to be spent. This may lead to conventional waste: the
government may build tunnels that lead nowhere. But suppose now that
the Minister for Trade is restricting imports and allocating licenses for
scarce imports which then fetch a hefty premium to those who are able to
get the licenses: economists call these premia "windfall profits" or, more
technically, "rents" to scarcity. You and I will lobby to get these licenses, of
course, for we can get rich by getting them. The economist Anne Krueger,
who highlighted this phenomenon, described the situation of people
seeking to get these licenses as "rent-seeking" whereas I have called it
unproductive profit-seeking.23 Its effect is to have us spend resources trying
to make money by lobbying to persuade politicians and bureaucrats to give
these licenses to us rather than to others, instead of using these resources
to produce useful goods and services and make profits that way. Such rent-
seeking wastes resources then as swiftly and surely as if our governments
were directly wasting them by building white elephants.
The reality is that lobbies that inevitably indulge in rent-seeking, even
23
 Cf. Anne Krueger, 'The Political Economy of the Rent-seeking Society", American
Economic Review. June 1974; and Jagdish Bhagwati, "Directly Unproductive Profit -
Seeking (DUP) Activities", Journal of Political Economy. October 1982.
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in rent-creation where governments are persuaded to create by policy the
scarcities that lead to the rents that are then collected by the lobbies, are
an endemic and indeed a growing presence in democratic societies. The
good that they produce, in creating for instance the different perspectives
on policy that alone can lead to informed policy, can be outweighed by
such costs. Economists are busy debating how large these costs are; but
that they do obtain under democracies is indisputable. And that such costs
would be less under dictatorships is equally plausible even though there
would be rent-seeking in the form of trying to become the brother-in-law of
the dictator so that the licenses come to oneself (as they do in fact accrue to
the families of most dictators in reality)!
On the other hand, the other possible defect of democratic
governance, the paralysis of government that a proliferation of lobbying can
cause, is an outcome of lesser likelihood. It has however occurred to many
shrewd observers who have contemplated the recent gridlock in the US
Congress. Of course, the United States has a form of democratic
governance where the President must deal with a Congress whose
members are not subject to the Party whip and instead regard themselves
as autonomous agents with whom the President must bargain on each
issue. David Broder, the perceptive political columnist of The Washington
Post has remarked that the United States has virtually 536 Presidents. In
turn, these members of Congress are responsive to their constituents,
hence to lobbies, to a degree that is unparalleled in other forms of
democratic governance. As a wit has remarked, a US Congressman is
virtually required to supply a missionary for breakfast if a cannibal
constituent demands it!
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But "demosclerosis", the arteriosclerosis or clogging of arteries that
afflicts the US democracy, is an acute product of a certain institutional
structure of democracy, surely "off the curve" and off the wall as far as other
institutional forms of democracy (such as the British Parliamentary model)
are concerned. It does not seem to me to be an affliction that democracy
must inherently accept.
But if you do, then a benign or "soft" authoritarianism sounds
attractive as an alternative until you ask, as I did already, whether the
authoritarian rulers will in fact have the incentives to deliver development to
their subjects by making the "right" choices. That a few did, as seems to
have been the case in the Far East in the postwar period, when in fact
countless others in the socialist world and in many nations in Africa and
South America did not, is hardly proof that this would be the central
tendency of authoritarian rulers. In fact, the foregoing analysis and
evidence strongly suggests otherwise.
The Quality of Democracy and The Quality of Development
The analysis of democracy's impact on development must reflect, as I
have already remarked, the fact that the institutional structure that
democracy provides is critical. In fact, Adam Smith's profound case for
laissez faire in economic matters24 must be understood in light of the fact
24
 Most economists are fully aware that Adam Smith did allow for governmental
intervention , indeed asked for it, in matters such as education where he thought
that, while the division of labour produced economic benefits, it would produce
automatons turning the screw to the left or to the right every day, all the time, like
Charlie Chaplin in Modern Times, so that education would have to be provided to
restore them as human beings with texture and sensitivity. To regard Adam Smith
as a strict proponent of abolition of all intervention by the state, as is often done by
extreme conservatives and libertarians, is to understand Adam Smith improperly.
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that democracy in his time was based on suffrage that was not universal but
was confined to those with property, so that both he and the philosopher
David Hume, two of the greatest minds of their century, could not vote. The
government that such a democracy produced led to governance that, in
economic matters, was one that Adam Smith castigated as inefficient and
socially undesirable because it reflected oligarchic interests. Laissez faire,
if only adopted somehow in place of the economic governance produced
by this form of democracy, would provide a superior organizing principle:
but, to my knowledge, Adam Smith did not indicate how one could get this
done!25
So, what might be called the quality of democracy matters greatly. A
defective oligarchic democracy may well distort economic choices in the
inefficient direction, imperiling prosperity. But then it may also affect what
might be called the quality of development.
Development is many-sided; it is not just the growth rates of income.
True social needs such as public health, protection of the environment,
and the elimination or relief of extreme poverty cannot be provided unless
governments have the resources that only growth can generate. But the use
of these resources for such public needs will not automatically follow unless
the political system permits, and provides the incentives, to mobilize and
translate those needs into effective demands. I would say that democratic
regimes that are characterized by structures and processes that provide
effective access by the groups, often on the economic periphery, who are to
profit most from these social programmes, are more likely to have such
social needs translated into effective demands.
25
 Adam Smith would thus have been an inadequate guide to economic reforms!
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The central nature of this observation about the ability and the
incentive to vote and to mobilize under democracy is seen best by
examining the contention of economists such as Amartya Sen that
democracy has promoted the control of famines in India because India's
democracy implies a free press so that we get informed about famines
such as the Bihar famine whereas the big Chinese famine under Mao was
hidden from view by his iron rule.26
I believe that this contrast is a trifle too simplistic about the advantage
of democracy in such matters. For one thing, information about the
occurrence of a serious famine tends to diffuse and become widely
available in one way or another within most countries, even authoritarian
ones. There are several ways in which such information has traditionally
spread among the people in even the most traditional societies: Indian
sociologists have shown conclusively for example that the notion of the
"self-sufficient village" is a myth.27 I have little doubt that this is true of China
as well, and that serious research which may become possible with the
political opening up of China will reveal that information on the Chinese
famine was not confined wholly to where it occurred and must have diffused
horizontally in traditional ways.
Of course, I can think of ways in which such horizontal diffusion of the
information on the famine could have been handicapped in Mao's China.
Thus, the extreme totalitarianism under Mao may have reduced such
traditional diffusion of knowledge among his subjects because of severe
restrictions on travel within China at the time.
28
 See, for example, Jean Dreze and Amartya Sen, Hunger and Public Action. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1989.
27
 Cf. M.N.Srinivas and Arvind Shah, 'The Myth of the Self-Sufficiency of the Indian Village",
The Economic Weekly, 12 (1960), pp. 1375-1378.
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Again, the horizontal diffusion of knowledge of the famine may have
been crippled due to "denial". Thus, we know from Nadezhda
Mandelstam's poignant observation in her memoirs that the potential
victims of Stalin's terror wished to assume that those who had been seized
and destroyed were truly guilty of the crimes they were being charged with
because,if they were not, then the fact of one's guiltlessness would not
protect one from a similar arbitrary fate at the hands of Stalin's police.
Equally, China's peasantry may well have discounted reports of a
catastrophic famine in China, unmet by corrective relief, so as to protect
themselves psychologically from the propsects of a similar, cruel fate.
True, "hard" authoritarian regimes make it easy for the rulers (as
distinct from citizens) to be shielded from unpleasant news: the messenger
is not protected in such regimes from the retribution that his disturbing
message may provoke in an arbitrary regime. Thus, vertical diffusion of
information could be impaired under totalitarian regimes simply because
the incentive structure of such regimes makes it costly to those below.
But, whether the information on a serious famine is widely diffused
horizontally or vertically, the key fact we must confront is that it is available
for sure at the level where the famine occurs. The key question then is
whether this information will translate better under democracy into
pressures for a change in the regime's policies in the required direction.
And here we come to the real reasons why democracy would fare
better than a dictatorship in addressing serious famines. Surely, a
democratic regime is able to provide the ability, and the incentive. to
translate the information on the famine on the ground into pressure on the
government to change its policies as required. Mobilisation by the citizens
25
through meetings, marches, representations and petitions is surely difficult,
if not impossible, in dictatorships. The incentive to do so would also be less
because the probability of affecting a dictator's policies through such
means is surely less (and the risks of retribution for one's labours
substantially greater28 ) than in a democracy.
Both the incentive and the ability to vote, to mobilize and to be heard,
are thus the key ways in which the quality of one's democracy matters to
the quality of development. A governance where the poor or the minorities
(such as women until only recently in Switzerland) are effectively unable to
vote, for example, then is simply not good enough. A judiciary that protects
habeas corpus is not as good as one that also provides effective standing
for the poor through public interest litigation (as in India). A free press is
important but not as good as one that reflects broader interests than those
of the elite.
Improving Democracy: Technology and NGOs:
As it happens, not merely has democracy spread around the world;
its quality has also improved. The diffusion of ideas and better democratic
practices is swift today: public interest litigation is spreading from India;
judicial review, originating in the United States, is coming to the European
28
 Thus, it is wellknown that fear among the rural Party-government cadres was one of the
most critical factors in the Chinese famine. The information certainly existed about the famine
at the ground level but the incentive to act on it by seeking immediate relief and action was
missing because of the totalitarian structure of the Maoist government. Local officials in
some of the famine-stricken areas assumed that Beijing would react to the famine by
retribution against them because of failure to fulfill outlandish production targets, instead of
reacting by procuring necessary food from, say, foreign countries via commercial or aid-
financed imports as the Indian government did during the Bihar famine.
Hence, we must also ask whether totalitarian regimes will react to information, even
when available, in a way that would address it meaningfully. The incentive for such regimes
to address a serious famine is itself likely to be less compelling than for democracies.
On the Chinese famine, see the interesting article by Thomas Bernstein,
"Stalinism, Famine, and Chinese Peasants: Grain Procurements during the Great Leap
Forward", Theory and Society. Vol. 13, No.3, May 1984, pp.339-377.
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nations.29
The two contributory factors of central importance in this steady
progress of democracy and its quality as also the quality of development in
consequence, are the revolutionary information technology today that
makes the willful rejection or suppression of the interests of the peripheral
groups more difficult, and equally makes the growth of nongovernmental
organizations that represent these interests more effective in the political
domain.
Ironically, the celebrated pessimists George Orwell and Aldous
Huxley, the authors of 1984 and The Brave New World, imagined modern
technology as the enemy of freedom and the unwitting tool of
totalitarianism: things however have turned out for the better, not worse.
Modern technology was supposed to make Big Brother omnipotent,
watching you into submission; instead it has enabled us to watch Big
Brother into impotence. Faxes, video cassettes, CNN have plagued and
paralyzed dictators and tyrants, accelerating the disintegration of their rule.30
As a wit has remarked, the PC ( the personal computer) has been the
deathknell of the CP (the communist party).31
Equally, modern technology has illuminated the obscure face of
poverty and pestilence, propelling us in the direction of better development.
29
 See Bruce Ackerman, "What Kind of Democracy? The Political Case for Constitutional
Courts", paper presented to the Nobel Symposium on Democracy's Victory and Crisis.
Uppsala University, August 27-30, 1994; also mimeographed. Yale University Law School.
30
 This observation also provides yet another critique of the emphasis on information within
the country as the key difference that makes famine prevention more likely under a
democracy. It is not the information within the country that is likely to be much different; it is
the information that percolates out of the country. Is there any doubt that even Mao would
have found it difficult to ignore the big famine in China if only the outside world had been
able to see, through CNN or other access to China, the deaths and pestilence?
31
 One may well conjecture what would have been the outcome of Mao's big famine if only
the outside world had had even a glimpse of it. As it happens, only the journalist Alsop
wrote about it at the time and no one quite believed it.
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Modern information technology thus produces the extended empathy that
can inform a democracy into better democracy. On the other hand, it also
increasingly takes work into homes where we work in isolation at our
computer terminals, linked only long-distance to others living and working
elsewhere, so that the economies from working under one roof, which the
Industrial Revolution ushered in and which Adam Smith theorized about,
and which led to factories in place of the earlier "putting out" system of
production, are now receding. This can produce less bonding and hence
more alienation that can coexist with increase in extended empathy. Thus,
we may well see both weakened bonds within communities and
strengthened bonds between them.32
The recent rise of NGOs, cutting across countries but built around
societal issues such as the protection of the environment and of labour
rights, may be explained partly in terms of such extended empathy that
produces common international causes and movements.33 They certainly
constitute a powerful new institutional phenomenon that serves to make the
voice of the periphery within each nation more audible since it is exercised
with other similar voices in unison.
It is also a remarkable fact that the hostility of governments in the
developing countries to the activities of foreign institutions, among them
NGOs, has reduced sharply today. This is a seachange from the early
postwar years when the developing countries jealously guarded their
sovereignty and worried about neocolonialism, embraced the West warily
32
 The former phenomenon seems to have arisen in the United States, for this and other
reasons, as documented startlingly by the political scientist, Robert Putnam.
33
 Lester Salomon, in his article on "The Rise of the Nonprofit Sector"in Foreign Affairs.
July/August 1994, has documented the rise of national and international NGOs, calling it
the global "associations revolution" and analyzing several cultural and political aspects of
this phenomenon.
28
and, in place of the notion that such embrace would lead to mutual gain,
feared instead a malign impact and even malign intent . Again, it is in
keeping with Kantian reasoning that it is the democracies that have opened
their doors wider in this way, not the authroitarian governments: witness
the contrast between India and China again.
Democracy and Markets:
Evidently then the "cruel dilemma" thesis, forcing us to choose
between democracy and development, was too simpleminded; the
relationship between the two is far more textured, and less unfavourable to
democracy, than we thought then.
But we can say something more. Think of well-functioning markets as
leading, ceteris paribus, to development: that seems to be quite plausible,
both in light of theory and empirical evidence.34 Since democracy and
authoritarian rule are in reality combined with absence or prevalence of
well-functioning markets, we may well ask whether experience suggests
anything interesting in regard to the interaction among these two sets of
institutions.
The postwar reality seems to divide into the following typologies on
these two dimensions:
'Democracy with Markets: By and large, these are the Western
34
 The economist Alice Amsden likes to say, in regard to Korean experience, that they did
well by "getting prices wrong", because the state used credit allocations etc. to affect
resource allocation. But surely this is conceptually confused or misleading: if they did the
right things, then they were getting the social or "shadow" prices right and these were
different from the market prices. In other words, market prices and social costs were
unequal, requiring state taxes and/or subsidies to fix the market failure. So, the "right prices"
were different from the market prices, and the Korean authorities did well by using the "right
prices" rather than the inappropriate or "wrong" market prices to guide allocation. Whether
these interventions were in fact sensible is a different and difficult question, on which there
is division of opinion.
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democracies; they have strong performance until theOPEC crisis; they also
have generally good social indicators;
*Democracv without Markets: India is the prime example; she had a
sorry economic performance and her social indicators are also
unsatisfactory;
^Authoritarian Rule with Markets: China in the last decade, and the
Far Eastern countries since the 1960s, belong here; they had a rapid
impact on poverty and their social indicators are not bad;
'Authoritarian Rule without Markets: These are the former socialist
countries; they are abysmal failures, both in terms of growth and social
indicators.
What do we learn, if anything, from this typology? I should say:
perhaps not much that is firm and compelling, in itself, since any typology
on just the two dimensions of "democracy" and "markets", each in turn
concealing variations in the "quality" of democracy and of markets, leaves
out too many complicating factors that affect specific outcomes.
Nonetheless, the typology does suggest three broad propositions that a
reasonable analyst should be able to defend without being summarily
routed:
* where neither democracy nor markets function, the incentive
structure for production and innovation will have been weakened so much
as to impair productivity and growth;
* markets can deliver growth, with or without democracy; and
* democracy without markets is unlikely to deliver significant growth.
The last proposition, which speaks naturally to India's experience in
the postwar period until the current reforms, is perhaps the most interesting
to contemplate further.35 Why should the lack of well-functioning markets
35
 Of course, India was not without markets altogether. But the vast overreach of
bureaucratic intervention in the economy meant that India came pretty close to having few
well-functioning markets in trade and in the modern economy.
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subtract from democracy's possibly favourable effects on development?
The answer seems to cry out from Indian experience. Democracy,
with its civil and political rights including the ability to travel36, work and be
able to learn and invent abroad, has made the elite Indians, who had the
advantage of access to modern education over a century, extremely
capable of absorbing, even building intellectually on, innovative ideas and
technologies from everywhere. But the ability to translate those ideas and
knowhow into effective innovation and productive efficiency was seriously
handicapped by the restrictions that straitjacketed economic decisions at
all levels. Thus, for instance, even while Indian surgeons were right at the
frontier in open heart surgery, following the Massachussetts General
Hospital's feat shortly thereafter in Bombay, the inability to import medical
equipment without surmounting strict exchange controls, even when gifts
were at issue, prevented the effective diffusion of technology to India on a
scale commensurate with her abilities. Equally, the incentive to produce
and to innovate was seriously compromised because the returns to such
activity could not be substantial when there were extensive restrictions on
production, imports and investment.37
By contrast, the Far Eastern economies, countries with markets
despite authoritarianism, profited immensely from the far freer inward
diffusion of technology that their substantially freer domestic and
36
 The Indian Supreme Court has arguably upheld this right more broadly than even the US
Supreme Court which has upheld restrictions on travel to Cuba, for instance. Thus, in the
wellknown case, Mrs. Maneka Gandhi versus Union of India and Another, decided on
January 25, 1978, the leading judgment by Justice P.N.Bhagwati treated the right to travel
abroad as part of "personal liberty" and the impounding by the government of the passport
of Mrs. Maneka Gandhi under Section 10 of the Passports Act of 1967 was struck down as
an infringement of Article 21 of the Constitution.
37
 The deleterious effects of such restrictions on the Soviet economy's dismal performance
have been extensively documented by Sovietologists such as Joseph Berliner, Abram
Bergson and Pad ma Desai.
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international markets permitted and facilitated. The economic interventions
of the Indian government, after the early years of more satisfactory growth
and promotional rather than restrictive interventions that jumpstarted the
economy from its lower pre-lndependence growth rates, degenerated
quickly into a series of "Don'ts", straitjacketing the economic decisions of
the citizens. On the other hand, the Far Eastern economies worked with a
series of "Do's" that left open considerable room for freedom to produce
and innovate (in shape, especially, of importing new-vintage and
economically productive technologies).38
The chief lesson may then well be that democracy and markets are
the twin pillars on which to build prosperity.39
38
 The contrast be tween intervent ions in shape of "Don' ts" and "Do's" was made by m e
earlier in Protect ionism. Cambr idge: MIT Press, 1988.
39
 In this regard, I must also cite an ambitious statistical study by the economist Surjit Bhalla,
"Freedom and Economic Growth: A Virtuous Cycle?", paper presented to the Nobel
Symposium on Democracy's Victory and Crisis. Uppsala University, August 27-30, 1994.
Bhalla works with 90 countries for 1973-1990. His conclusions are broadly supportive of the
propositions I have outlined in the Lecture, while he concludes more strogly that the
statistical evidence shows a favourable impact of "political freedom" (i.e. democracy), when
treated in a way that enables us to differentiate among different democracies in terms of how
democractic they are on different relevant dimensions. His definition of development also
extends beyond growth rates to include a couple of social variables: secondary school
enrollment and decline in infant mortality. I might add that Bhalla's work is unique among
several recent statistical studies in looking at both economic and political "freedom" in
exploring the connection between democracy and development.
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